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Abstract
In 15 years, the international community has been blamed for resorting too easily to the use of
force on some occasions (Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo), and also it has been blamed for intervening
too late or not at all in other crises (Rwanda, Bosnia and today Sudan and Congo). Even today, one
of the most contested questions of international politics is the legitimacy for the use of force. David
Chandler, Professor of International Relations at the University of Westminster (UK) and Daniele
Archibugi, a research director at National Research Council (Italy) and Professor at Birkbeck
College (University of London), discuss about the use of force, how the theory and practice of
warfare and humanitarian intervention have evolved in the contemporary world and the
international responsibility of states. In his Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building (Pluto
Press), David Chandler has forcefully argued that Western interventions are destablizing exercises
of power without responsibility. Daniele Archibugi has been equally critical of these armed
interventions, although in his The Global Commonwealth of Citizens. Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy
(Princeton University Press), he urges for a cosmopolitan responsibility based on non-violence and
inclusion.2
Nieves Zu´n˜iga: The idea that force can be used for self-defense has been
traditionally accepted in international law. How has the concept been
expanded over the past years?
David Chandler: I think the main way that it has been expanded is that it is no
longer seen as a universal right of self-defense. So for some powers, the self-selecting
American-led ‘coalitions of the willing’ have argued that they have a right to self-
defense that other countries don’t necessarily have. That brings the definitions of
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self-defense*who makes the decisions about self-defense and what it entails*into a
new era. It is no longer something adjudicated by the UN, limited to an image of
direct threat, but has been expanded much more broadly. Not merely in terms of the
willingness to use force and the legitimacy of the objects of such force, but also in the
idea that for some countries it is legitimate to use self-defense, but not for others.
You’d never get people arguing that India or Pakistan have the right to self-defense or
pre-emptive strikes against potential threats or should act globally in terms of
preventive intervention. It’s very clear that this is a definition that stands outside any
formal framework of international law. No-one is arguing for a broader extension of
the right to self-defense; the debate is one of Western or ‘Great Power’ responsi-
bilities.
Daniele Archibugi: The legitimacy of self-defense is one of the problems of
international life, but it is not the only one. An equally important problem is the
effectiveness of self-defense. Even if the United Nations Charter and international
law guarantee the right to self-defense to almost everybody, the real problem is that
some powers are able to defend themselves while others are not. For example, a weak
political entity such as the Palestinian people might have the legal right to self-
defense but this is not very useful since they lack the instruments to exercise this
right. And therefore this should induce us to look forward. The international system
should evolve from a situation in which the strong players have and can exercise their
right to self-defense to a system of collective security that will make self-defense
useful for all players, including the weak ones. In turn, this requires that self-defense
is guaranteed by international institutions and international organizations. This is
going to be in the interests of the weakest rather than of the strongest.
D. Ch.: Who would give those weak states more rights? In a period where the
framework of international relations is much more hierarchical than it was before,
how would you possibly attempt to resurrect an order of rights and constitutionalism
reminiscent of the UN Charter framework of the Cold War period?
D. A.: David is touching on one of the many points on which we disagree. Shall we
understand the legal framework as something which is in the interest of the stronger
or something which is the interest of the weaker? Let’s assume that it was possible
today to get rid of the UN and of the existing norms of international law. Would this
be in the interest of the weaker or of the stronger? My opinion is that the weaker
would have more to lose, because by going back to a state of nature the stronger
would not have any legal constraints on their use of power.
D. Ch.: That’s true, but what Daniele is talking about is pure idealism. It’s not the
case that during the Cold War period and the UN Charter that it was international
law that prevented countries from undertaking self-defense, or that maintained a
period of so-called peace. It was much more the balance of power which meant that
any interventions in countries or breaches of sovereignty risked a superpower
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conflict. It was that balance of power between America and the Soviet Union that
helped protect the independence and the sovereignty of smaller countries. Daniele
forwards an understanding of the operation of international law independently of
social relations and reality. To argue that international law on its own could solve the
problems would merely result in providing a legal cover for interventionism. As we’ve
seen in the discussions about changing the international laws, it’s the major powers
that are calling for reform, not the small countries. So I think there’s a real danger in
this idealist framework.
D. A.: Sometimes it seems that once upon a time there was a golden period. This
golden period was supposedly when two states had enough weapons to destroy each
other and every form of life in the planet. I contest the view that during the Cold War
developing countries were better off then they are now. On the contrary, they were
used by the United States and the Soviet Union as weapons in a rival international
strategy. There were often local wars fought with the weapons, the money and the
dictatorial political leaders supported by one of the two superpowers. Local wars
were more frequent then than now, and more people got killed then than now. I am
not saying that the situation has improved much now. The international situation is
very gloomy today as it used to be in the past. And it is quite bad because there is a
hegemonic power with too much power and there are not other counter-balancing
forces. But can we go back to a situation where there is a Leonid Brezhnev able to
contest American hegemony? For me, this is not only undesirable, it is simply
impossible. If this is the case, what we need to do is to develop some checks and
balances that will be able to tame the abuses of powers, including the American
power.
N. Z.: Can preventive war be considered self-defense?
D. A.: Of course not. Preventive wars cannot be sold as defensive wars. They are and
they have always been a form of aggression which is banned by international law and
by international organizations. Since today the world is dominated by democratic
states, it is crucial that these states incorporate within their internal constitution the
existing norms of international conduct. The most important thing today in
international relations is to get a regime change in the US to get a government
which repudiates entirely the legitimacy of preventive wars.
D. Ch.: It seems difficult to tame American hegemony through an ideal framework
of law. In the UN Charter period we had a certain clarity about what international
law and wars of aggression meant. Wars of aggression were defined as wars not
supported by the UN Charter chapter 7. I think that your question about whether a
preventive war is a war of self-defense or a war of aggression reveals the subjective
nature of our judgment, because there is no clear framework of law. The problems
with the clarity of international law on this subject started in the 1990s when people
argued that we needed preventive wars: wars of humanitarian intervention. Once the
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restrictions on preventive wars were brought into question, the floodgates were
opened. The removal of a shared consensus about what the law was has created a
framework where Great Power hegemony can be promoted in a more direct and
hierarchical way.
N. Z.: In spite of the overall architecture of the international system, there
are recurrent international crises with massive human rights violations and
genocides. Do the most powerful states have an obligation to intervene to
prevent and stop these genocides?
D. A.: Genocides have continued to occur since the end of the Second World War,
and it does not seem that the end of the Cold War has generated any significant
change. Whenever there has been a major humanitarian crisis, the reaction of the
international community has been very weak both in terms of prevention and
intervention. Certainly, people endangered, either in the former Yugoslavia or in
Rwanda, have not been helped at all by the skeptical statements of those people
defending the dogma of sovereignty and of non-intervention. Something more
effective should be done: if there is a problem of humanitarian crises, an international
society should be able to provide answers by creating appropriate accountable
institutions. The alternative is to behave as the international society did in the
Rwandan crisis in 1994, namely doing nothing, leading to the killing of about
800,000 people. I hope that we have learnt the lesson.
D. Ch.: I think that in Rwanda, as with Bosnia, the international community was
closely involved from the beginning. People were aware that there was already
international reform of the governing process that created instability. There was also
a war going on: an invasion from Uganda that was supported by America and Britain.
One of the reasons that there was an unwillingness to intervene was that the
international community was already so involved. The understanding that the
genocide came out of nowhere, is as ridiculous as the idea that the genocide in Bosnia
came out of nowhere without international intervention, which ignores the whole
international involvement in the break up of Yugoslavia, the recognition of the
separation of the republics and the undermining of the rights of the federal state to
defend its borders.
Unless we look at who we are asking to intervene and how the intervention is made
accountable or isn’t accountable, the discussion is purely an ideal one: a fantasy
world, where the good guys come in on their white horses to save people who are
either too stupid or too uncivilized to resolve their own problems. My point is that
posing the discussion in these terms isn’t really related to the real issues of
international relations. It is no coincidence that in a world where there’s a breakdown
of traditional frameworks of international relations and an undermining of the rights
of smaller states, everyone should be going around discovering the savagery or the
lack of political legitimacy of smaller countries in other parts of the world, rather than
looking at the problems in our own countries. Why is it that Western States, Western
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politicians, and critical liberal theorists need to find a sense of political purpose by
criticizing governments in other parts of the world?
D. A.: Of course, any historical circumstance is preceded by a long chain of events.
In this long series of events it is very likely that players have been driven by their
interests, and certainly the Western world has a long past of brutalities. But it seems
equally a caricature to present world history as idyllic, with peoples loving each other
until the ‘stupid white man’ has started to be involved. Of course the white man is
often as stupid as men of any other color. Part of this stupidity is the periodic
outbreaks of mass murders. When these occur, a humanitarian intervention should
be performed by proper institutions. Surprisingly enough, Western democracies have
a very bad record in carrying out humanitarian interventions so far. In his
comprehensive review of the historical cases, Nicholas Wheeler indicates three
successful cases of humanitarian intervention: India in East Pakistan in 1971,
Tanzania in Uganda in 1979, and Vietnam in Cambodia in 1979. None of them was
carried out by a Western democracy. This suggests that we can do better by creating
multi-lateral institutions with the participation of Western democracies, but not
dominated by them.
D. Ch.: I think you’ll find that those three cases may have had positive outcomes
from a humanitarian point of view, and could retrospectively be understood as
humanitarian interventions, but they were also driven by a conception of the national
self-interest of the neighboring states intervening. This is an important point. The
idea that we should formalize an idea of a right or an obligation to intervene where
there are no national interests and just assume that because states have the power to
intervene, they have a right or duty to intervene in the affairs of other countries, when
they don’t have an interest in the outcome of stability or concern for that region’s
future, leaves the whole project a hostage to fortune. Governments may appeal to
popular opinion and say that they are doing something to save the poor uncivilized
Rwandans or Bosnians or people in Darfur but we know that those policies are purely
led by the image of themselves rather than any clear strategic interest. And I think
there’s a problem in giving additional rights to power. With these ‘rights’ there is no
accountability and no relationship of equality.
This so-called right or obligation of intervention is a responsibility that major
powers take on that is very dangerous, because it’s a narcissistic responsibility that
cares nothing for the outcome. We can see the same thing when you look at all sorts
of policies in relationship to Africa and to non-Western states where there is a
discourse of poverty reduction and ethical policies but it’s actually about creating the
self-image of the generous West with a policy of values and forming a self-identity
with a sense of purpose for the EU and the UN. Also, I think that the disassociation
between the power of the policy maker and the people whose lives are affected on the
ground is inevitably going to result in problems. The notion that only outsiders who
intervene can solve the problems is crazy. When it comes to our domestic politics no-
one says if only the government would intervene, it would solve the problems of child
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abuse, drugs, prostitution, violence on the streets, and so on. It’s only in the
international sphere that you can have this fantasy of an external source of power
magically resolving all the problems. If we were to think of it in a more political sense,
we would realize that one of the reasons why these governments are so keen to talk
about problems elsewhere is that they lack a clear political vision in relation to their
own societies. That might make us think twice before we give them new rights and
mandates to intervene in other places around the world.
N. Z.: In that case, what is the role of development aid from developed
states?
D. A.: From what David just said the straightforward policy conclusion is that the
development aid should be canceled. There’s no reason why Western states should
give money to developing countries: it’s narcissistic. The danger of this approach is
that it looks mainly at the motivations rather than impact. Any action due to self-
interest or image is fine. I do not expect humans to be entirely altruistic agents. Even
if they are not, the outcome might sometimes be positive, so development aid should
not be cut, but increased. The bulk of the budget spent by any government is for
domestic purposes. A minority of the money, 0.1% in the US and 0.3% in the EU,
goes to development aid. It’s clear that the rich part of the world doesn’t do much.
It’s wrong to say that they are particularly concerned with what’s happening abroad,
they are mainly concerned about what they should do at home. Should the tiny
responsibility of the global sphere be improved or abandoned? We shouldn’t forget
that in the 20th century, 75% of the people that died as a result of political violence,
died because of internal political violence and 25% died because of international
political conflicts. So I would say there’s still a problem with ways in which we can
control the power of governments to defend their own subjects. This applies not only
to the developing world but everywhere, for example to Nazi Germany and the Soviet
Union which were not under-developed countries when massive genocides took
place.
D. Ch.: There’s an idea that there’s a perfect solution and all we have to do is get rid
of politics and then external experts can make governments practice ‘good
governance’ and do all the right things and solve all the problems because we know
all the answers. The only problem is that the ‘expertise’ concerned doesn’t really
exist. And there are no external technical solutions to political problems, even in
terms of even making our own governments accountable, let alone making
international institutions accountable for what they do within the international
sphere or other states. One problem is that Daniele is confusing narcissism and self-
interest. International intervention today is very different from in the Cold War:
rather than some imperialist carve-up for resources or invading Kosovo because of oil
pipelines or wanting more regulation and intervention in Africa to exploit raw
materials, I think there’s very little of that old-fashioned, coherent planning and
desire to regulate and control and so what we are talking about is not really a matter
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of self-interest. If there was, there might be some semi-rational outcomes to it. These
policies towards Africa and other international issues, like saving the environment,
are much more narcissistic. They’re governments trying to evade the problems of the
domestic sphere by arguing that the real problems lie elsewhere or are out of their
control.
With regard to governments focusing on the domestic sphere, if you look at the
press coverage, you’ll see it’s the opposite, that the international sphere*whether
you look at America, Europe or anywhere else*has dominated the press over the last
decade or so. Even in Britain it’s clear that the only issue where Tony Blair and
Gordon Brown have any credibility is over Africa. Tony Blair’s leading the
Commission for Africa; Gordon Brown hasn’t got much of a reputation for the
British economy, but he’s over there lecturing the African governments about
corruption. That doesn’t mean that a lot of money is spent in the international
sphere and that’s what I mean about narcissism. It’s about rhetoric; it’s about
counterposing us as a ‘good government’ to other countries, whether it’s Eastern
Europe, Asia or Africa, who have ‘bad governments’. There’s a constant rhetorical
sphere of declarations condemning other countries and quite often an unwillingness
to undertake to do anything because you can always blame America, or someone
else*the gap between high blown policy rhetoric and limited practice is quite
astounding. Aid isn’t really concerned with the economic problems of African states
and the development of their economies and their industries. There’s simply no way
that development aid could be a solution to these broader socio-economic problems.
D. A.: Are you suggesting cutting development aid?
D. Ch.: What I’m saying is that development aid hasn’t been shown to be effective.
Many analysts correctly point out that aid doesn’t often lead to sustainable, coherent
frameworks of development, and that serious economic policy making, if there was a
real concern about African development would take an entirely different approach.
Expecting international governments to rationally assist other countries is as
ridiculous as to expect them to rationally develop their domestic policies. It’s very
difficult for governments to structure a clear political strategy because there’s a crisis
of political meaning and purpose within the West. That’s why governments want to
transfer their focus abroad.
If you look at the new relations between Western institutions and, particularly,
African states, you find that the problem with aid and debt reduction is that it comes
with strings attached about policy frameworks, heavily restricting African sovereignty
and state’s independence. And the debt reduction is specifically managed through
new frameworks of internationalizing the institutions of African states, where
Western institutions tell African governments how to allocate their money and how
to manage their policies. The problem isn’t giving money to African states at all: it’s
the political conditionality that comes with it. The main impact hasn’t been poverty
reduction and the development of Africa and greater African independence. The
impact has been a loss of Africa’s political autonomy. So despite the rhetoric of
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empowerment and capacity building etc., I would argue that the new mechanisms of
regulation should be opposed. And that’s not a critique of giving aid in itself, it’s a
critique of the new elitist, patronizing climate where the aid donors think that they
can manage African economies and societies better than African people themselves.
N. Z.: It is clear that the international system is based on some relations of
dependency unfair for several states. How could a fair international system
be possible?
D.A.: The problem is that we are still in the infancy of an international society. So
far, there are a few powers which have too much power, mostly in the West, and we
must try to find some way to tame it. The good news is that part of the West has some
form of accountable democratic government and the bad news is that the
accountable and democratic government sometimes applies internally but does not
apply at an international level. That is why if we want to have a fairer international
society, we need to expand the checks and balances that have been successfully
created in some countries at an international level. Sometimes this can work, for
example, when America’s Supreme Court decided that the Guantanamo Prison is
illegal. And this is the way that international society can be constructed. If we would
have used the arguments of David one or two centuries ago, the conclusion would
have been that democracy was impossible, narcissistic and a fantasy to divert
attention away from other things. But even if theatrical and narcissistic, democracy
has managed to tame power much more than other regimes. Now the same thing
should be done at an international level.
D. Ch.: The point about world democracy and taming the US is that this is a highly
elitist view of the management of international affairs. Even though, like Western
governments and international institutions, Daniele talks about democracy and its
importance, you can see that underneath the excellent scheme that he outlines, the
one thing that’s missing is the people. In effect, he’s arguing that European states
should play a greater role in international society as a counterweight to America, as if
the Europeans could be good imperialists and good interveners and spread
democracy or spread nicer market relations than America. This is his view of taming
America, of the European elite playing a much more forceful and interventionist and
counterbalancing role.
N. Z.: What role should Europe play in this scenario?
D. Ch.: I think that this idea of the good Europeans versus the bad Americans is a
particular European conceit. If we look at the policies that the EU pursues, for
instance in the enlargements in Eastern Europe, you can see that the internationa-
lization of those state structures, the imposition of 80,000 pages of European acquis
in effect undermines those countries’ sovereignty. The EU doesn’t promote
democracy any more than America does. And I think that the argument that the
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EU is somehow preferring a nicer capitalism or is somehow more ethical and more
moral, is believing the EU’s Public Relations (PR) machine and taking press releases
at face value. While it’s true that the EU comprises of more than one state, it doesn’t
mean that it’s a new post-national constellation as Habermas would argue or a post-
modern actor that is no longer pursuing any form of interests or power in the world,
as Robert Cooper would argue. It is very dangerous to talk about taming American
power in this way because rather than looking at political problems and the American
people’s capacity to tame American power, to challenge the policies of the
government, the policies are immediately given over to other elites. In fact the more
you look at so-called cosmopolitan democracy advocates, the less substantial
democracy you see.
D. A.: A democratic society should be based on checks and balances and the more
checks and balances the better they are. Sometimes checks and balances are from
non-elected judges, sometimes from the people and of course the American people
should do much more than what they have done so far in order to tame this power. I
hope that Barack Obama will represent a change compared to the previous
administration. David is wrong on the EU: the EU has done much better than the
US at democratizing other countries. Let’s take the example of other Eastern
European countries. What I like about the EU is that as soon as they accept a new
member country: the Czech Republic, Poland, the Baltic Republics and so on, they
immediately provide to this country’s equal rights in the European condominium.
Soon these countries will be the president of the EU for six months, for example.
They will have proportional representation in the European Parliament and in many
other institutions. The US have never done anything like that. If we expand the
argument, we should argue that after they have been invaded by the Americans (and
many European countries) Iraq and Afghanistan should become the 51st and 52nd
members of the US. And of course that isn’t going to happen. So I see a basic
difference in the way which Americans patronize other countries, even today pushing
them to be democratic, and the way the EU does it.
In other words, the Americans use a power that is much more direct, while the EU,
precisely because it is a union of states, has the inclination to use sub-powers. Maybe
it’s also associated to the fact that it has less military capability and is an organization
with power divided among different national governments. In any international
situation, the more important players you get, the better it is. And if the EU could
manage to be a powerful organization to counter-balance the US, that would be very
helpful and ultimately also in the interest of the American people. Take the case of
Iraq. The Bush administration has managed to divide Europe. Half the European
countries decided to join the ‘coalition of the willing’ and the other half decided not
to. It’s good enough that in at least two countries, Spain and Italy, the national
governments that decided to join the coalition of the willing, were overthrown by the
voters at the next elections (even if in Italy not for very long). I would like to see a
powerful, regional organization in Latin America and in the African union. And the
basic idea of cosmopolitan democracy is that we are not advocating a structural
A Dialogue on international interventions
9
(page number not for citation purpose)
power on other people, but we are advocating structural power with other people. In
any proposal carried out by the cosmopolitan democracy approach we always assume
that the new institutions should be made by different people working together. These
institutions would reflect developing countries more than Western countries, for the
simple reason that developing countries have more people.
D. Ch.: I don’t think it’s true that American power is always exercised more directly
than Europe’s. It’s true that America is a major military power but it hasn’t really
used that military force that often. The invasion of Kosovo was supported by
practically all European states, and the war in Iraq was supported by some of them.
Britain is just as happy to use military power as America is. Britain has gone to war at
least as many times as America. Look at the French interventions and the role of Italy
in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The argument that the EU is promoting
democracy in the EU and is giving Eastern European accession states a set of choices
isn’t borne out by any empirical evidence. If you look at the agreements for joining
the EU, you find that the Eastern European states may have a vote when they get into
it but they can’t opt out of any of the clauses from the extended European acquis, so
the entire negotiation process is already loaded against Eastern Europe. If you look at
the Balkans, you’ll find that the EU special representative has the job of being the
high representative*an administrator with both executive and legislative power-
s*over Bosnia. And the EU has been more than happy to allow the continuation of
these dictatorial powers of the EU representative, including to sack elected
politicians and to impose laws by edict. In fact this makes the American occupation
of Iraq look weak and less ‘direct’.
The idea that America can be blamed for dividing the European countries and
creating uncertainty about foreign policy ignores the problems of the credibility of
European governments and the way that they will try to use the pro-war or the anti-
war card as a way of claiming moral credibility. The process of being for or against
the war was a fairly arbitrary one and you can’t just blame America for it.
D. A.: There are clear differences between the US and Europe. Of course the UK
and France have been to war many times but the EU as such hasn’t waged any war
because it doesn’t have the institutions to do that. The only occasion on which the
EU gave authorization for the use of force in the Kosovo war was through NATO.
The fact that there is no EU army means that the EU can use certain instruments,
but not others.
D. Ch.: So should there be an EU army?
D. A.: No.
D. Ch.: Should there be a UN army?
D. A.: Yes, possibly.
D. Archibugi & D. Chandler
10
(page number not for citation purpose)
D. Ch.: So why not an EU army?
D. A.: Because it’s not needed. The EU should use its soft power: soft power is much
more effective than hard power.
D. Ch.: So why does the UN need an army?
D. A.: Because in some cases of humanitarian emergencies, you need to intervene
with some forces. This army should be different from other ones: a police force rather
than an army.
N. Z.: One of the main political consequences of the invasion of Iraq was to
lower the political credibility of the UN. American neocons argue that the
UN is dead because it failed to provide its support to the world hegemonic
power. Now global activists argue that the UN is equally dead because it has
not managed to stop the Iraqi invasion. Is there still a function for the UN in
this century?
D. A.: The UN is in very bad shape because it has not yet managed to enforce its
Charter. The Security Council did not approve the Iraq War, nor did it make an
attempt to condemn it. This is for the simple reason that the US and UK are
permanent members. So the situation is gloomy, and for precisely this reason the UN
still has a vital role to play. This vital role will increase provided that more forces start
actively working within the UN, that some countries bring the public into the UN in
a more direct way, and that it becomes more closely linked to the many global
movements that have been active on global issues recently. All these actions are, of
course, to counter-balance the attempts of the major powers to use the UN as an
instrument of their foreign policy. Developing countries have so far been quite
divided and they haven’t managed to stop as much as they should have. The
European countries are also divided and some of them find an interest in using the
UN in this form. Thus the status quo remains.
But in spite of all this, I don’t think the world be a better place without the UN.
The UN is still a forum where everything can be discussed transparently. And the
fact that Colin Powell had to go before the Security Council to present evidence for
the alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) was a triumph for the UN. Once
upon a time in international politics, Kruschev and Kennedy or Nixon and Brezhnev
decided everything. And after a few months one country would go on the Western
side; another country would go on the Soviet side. There were a lot of wars and
people killed and there was no transparency or accountability. The people in the US
and Europe didn’t know what to do and couldn’t even oppose what the governments
were deciding because everything was secret. Now, at least, there is a bit more
transparency. The more we manage to use and improve the UN machinery for
international politics, the better things will be.
A Dialogue on international interventions
11
(page number not for citation purpose)
D. Ch.: In the past the UN was a political organization. It was concerned with
political consensus. It didn’t really do anything unless it had the wherewithal to act
on it, which is why all the exciting stuff happened in the smoke-filled rooms where
the diplomats got together and did their deals, and on the UN conference floor we
had fairly bland agreements. Today we seem to have the opposite situation:
everything happens out on the conference floor. It is very peculiar for a political
organization that is meant to be engaged in having a genuine framework of
consensus-building. That seems to have disappeared from the UN. If anything,
the UN acts like an NGO, making great moral statements*or as a platform for other
people to make moral declarations about poverty, AIDS, women’s rights and the
environment*declarations that have got very little to do with reality or actually
putting the resources or political will behind them. The UN plays a vital role as a
whipping boy who can be blamed when these grand declarations eventually come to
nothing. The fac¸ade of the UN that gives some political legitimacy to a process that
no longer involves any genuine framework of negotiation, that no longer involves
policy-making that is at all accountable, is a very dangerous one. The UN’s role in
legitimizing this pseudo-politics, where you can just make declarations and everyone
thinks it is fine, and maybe in ten years’ time we look at whether anything actually
happened and who’s to blame, is problematic because now, if ever, we need to have
some framework of political accountability. At least in the past there was a political
process, and the UN was a political and legal framework where sovereign states took
responsibility for their actions. Today there’s a real danger of rhetoric being distanced
from the real world.
N. Z.: What actions can be taken in order to increase the powers and
functions of the UN?
D. Ch.: The UN does not have power as an independent organization: it is an
association of states. It is a bit like increasing the power of the EU. If the EU member
states do not have a consensus of agreement on policies, the EU won’t have a lot of
power in that particular area. Maybe what we’re asking is: ‘How can we have a clear
and stable international order?’ I think the problem in attaining one is that
international politics is increasingly about rhetorical statements. Governments and
international institutions are not being sufficiently held to account. So the only way
we can begin to rein in the fantasy realm of the international is by holding domestic
governments to account and unfortunately there are no easy solutions to reviving the
process of getting people re-involved in politics. There are no easy shortcuts.
D. A.: I have got very clear views on what can be done to make the UN stronger.
Firstly, we can get at least one UN ambassador to be directly elected by the people of
each country. A UN ambassador will not just be an ambassador, but accountable to
some people. Also, the people will know what the UN is doing because advertising
campaigns will present evidence on UN actions and that will possibly make them
want to interact more with what is going on in New York. Secondly, many people,
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including myself, suggest creating a UN people’s assembly and the peace movement
in Italy has already done some general tests. On several occasions, the Perugia
Assembly of the Peoples of the United Nations invited representatives of citizens that
are not necessarily associated to their governments. This gives an idea of what a
World Parliament could look like: it could be made by a few hundred representatives,
with a majority of the deputies from developing countries. Even if such a new
Parliament would not have many powers, it will indicate that democracy is not a
Western monopoly.
One of the problems of the Reagan and Bush Jr. administrations is that they
assumed that since they were elected, any foreign policy decision they took was
legitimate. I think that increasing democracy in international organizations would be
a very good way in which you could destroy the rhetorical tool so often used by
American and European politicians. A global parliament will show that there is
another and wider democratic consensus.
D. Ch.: I am surprised that an advocate of democracy should understand democracy
in such empty and formal terms. The problems of democracy, accountability, and the
international arena are not going to be resolved by holding more and different
elections. What we need are political ideas and political alternatives. Just trying to
rearrange the game differently and have the UN ambassador come to schools or
getting people to vote in an election can not change the balance of power or the
balance of social relations in the world or even people’s views about what is possible
and what the sensible alternatives are. I think it is a very peculiar and dangerous idea
because you would only end up giving more legitimacy to an institution in which
some external view of independent legitimacy makes little sense because it only
works as an institution if it is dependent on political consensus between its member
states. And even worse, since an independently elected representative to the UN may
not even be a member of the same political party as the government, this would just
lead to the UN being even more of a rhetorical, non-policy-making forum. The idea
that we can only solve the problems of politics by adding different elections is a
purely technocratic and bureaucratic response, which ignores political and social
relations at the international level.
D. A.: All the arguments that David has provided against a UN people’s assembly of
elected ambassadors to the UN, can be applied in any country. And in the same
argument you should probably say that the Prime Minister in Britain should not be
elected and that the parliament in this country is useless. The arguments are precisely
the same. A clear causal relationship between formal institution and substantial
institution doesn’t exist: the two things progress hand in hand. They did, in an
imperfect way, within countries because we managed to get elected governments and
parliaments. If you read the old realist arguments against democratic governments
and parliaments, you see that are the same of those used today by David. In spite of
these sceptics, democracy managed to progress in some countries. By pushing
A Dialogue on international interventions
13
(page number not for citation purpose)
forward with incremental innovations at a world level, we would plant some seeds
that, in time, may bring us closer to global democracy.
D. Ch.: How would you possibly get closer to global democracy? If you took your
scheme seriously, you would be saying that state sovereignty would not be relevant,
and that would be creating a superpower that could override the rights of states. This
can only give more rights to power: it can only reinforce the status quo. The
international system is composed of states. Because we don’t live in a fantasy world
where we all share the same interests, where politics doesn’t exist, those ideas are
very dangerous.
D. A.: Structures of power do not destroy each other. In Italy, we managed to have
city governments in medieval times. As Robert Putnam showed, the local govern-
ment is effective when there were city governments already five or six centuries ago.
National government seems to be less a decisive factor in shaping the effectiveness of
local government than a long-term tradition. The national government has not
managed to destroy the good governments of cities like Siena, Florence, and
Bologna. Likewise, adding another form of government at the international level
doesn’t in any way imply that you reduce the existing forms of government. On the
contrary, you make them stronger because you provide a way in which issues which
are beyond their competences can be addressed.
N. Z.: Before finishing, I would like to ask you something related to the new
US President. The George W. Bush administration has violated interna-
tional law and it has paid a very small price. Do you think that the new
President Barack Obama will make a difference?
D. A.: A substantial part of the American public opinion was strongly dissatisfied
with the foreign polity of the Bush administration and, in fact, both John McCain
and Barack Obama promised a substantial turn in foreign policy. I am optimistic
about the Obama Presidency, but the world should not and cannot rely on the
goodwillingness of the tenant of the White House only. Something more is needed,
namely to develop global institutions that will constrain the national executive
powers, including the American one. I will urge the Obama administration to fully
participate to the international judicial institutions and, in particular, to adhere to the
International Criminal Court and to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice. This will be an incentive, perhaps small in terms of
power but large in terms of legitimacy, to respect the rule of law in foreign policy.
This will provide additional international ‘checks and balances’. If introduced,
democratic governments will have an increasing difficulty to explain to their
electorates why they have violated international laws while they require their own
citizens to respect the internal laws.
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D. Ch.: I think Daniele’s conflation of democracy with international law is a
dangerous one. In effect, he is arguing that unaccountable institutions should be able
to restrain, or could ‘make accountable’ national governments. International law is
not subject to popular accountability in the same way as domestic law and therefore
is much more likely to enforce rather than to challenge unequal power relations. In
arguing for international law, Daniele is, in effect, suggesting that bureaucrats should
be trusted more than elected representatives. This makes little sense. It would be
illusory to understand international law as somehow constraining US or European
power or to view International Criminal Court (ICC) intervention as playing a
positive role in conflict resolution in Africa or the Balkans. Law and power politics
are separate spheres, one is based on reciprocity and formal equality the other is
based on power relations. Attempting to force them together results in the
manipulation and politicization or law. I hope that Obama does not make the
therapeutic or token gesture of committing the US to international law, this would
merely weaken the legitimacy of international law further. At least Bush’s ‘US
exceptionalism’ expressed a certain honesty regarding the inequality of the
international sphere and the fact that, when it matters, international law is either
subservient to the needs of power or is empty rhetoric.
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